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WHERE IN THE WORLD ARE WE GOING WITH
THE NEW GENETICS?
John C. Fletcher, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION
Where in the world are we going with the new genetics? In attempting to
answer this question, this article will first introduce the reader to the new
genetics and highlight features of the old genetics.' Second, it analyzes the
main findings of a cross-cultural study of the approaches taken by medical
geneticists in eighteen nations to ethical problems in genetic counseling, pre-
natal diagnosis and screening.2 It identifies the major ethical problems in a
cross-cultural perspective and finally it proposes a set of ethical standards
which can be supported by geneticists in any nation who will not permit
destructive ethical relativisms to dominate their choices. It concludes by
leaving it to the reader to evaluate the relevance of this author's ethical re-
flections to law, public policy and regulation bearing upon research and
clinical practice in human genetics.
I. "THE NEW GENETICS"
Before the development of DNA technology and its first use in prenatal
diagnosis,' geneticists4 tested for harmful genetic mutations in two main
ways: 1) tests applied to proteins assumed to be defective due to an inherited
gene; and 2) measurements of the molecular weight of compounds assumed
to be abnormal due to inheritance. Observation of infants and children with
* Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Religious Studies, University of Virginia. This
article derives from a Brendan F. Brown Lecture delivered on October 13, 1988 at The Catho-
lic University of America, The Columbus School of Law, Washington, D.C. 20064. Although
I did not know Brendan F. Brown, I feel spiritual companionship with him and his work and
will try to do justice to his legacy.
1. For those who are unaware of such a major milestone in human genetics, see D.
WEATHERALL, THE NEW GENETICS AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1985), for an excellent
review of the new genetics that non-geneticists can readily understand.
2. D. WERTZ & J. FLETCHER, ETHICS AND HUMAN GENETICS: A CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE (1989) (in press).
3. See Kan & Dozy, Antenatal Diagnosis of Sickle-Cell Anemia By DNA Analysis of Am-
niotic-Fluid Cells, 2 LANCET 910, 911 (1978).
4. Medical geneticists study the relationship of heredity and disease and provide genetic
counseling, screening and access to prenatal diagnosis.
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genetic abnormalities and abnormal chromosomal findings were two addi-
tional methods of confirming hereditary disorders.5 The "old genetics" in-
volved tests or observations of the expression of harmful genes. The "new
genetics" exactly reverses this method and uses a direct test of DNA ob-
tained from nucleated cells of any tissue.
The most relevant public policy considerations for use of DNA technol-
ogy in the U.S. were raised by Holtzman: 6 1) Potentially, DNA tests for
affected persons and carriers of all major genetic disorders will become avail-
able as the human genome is mapped, although the validation of these tests
will be very difficult diae to genetic heterogeneity. 7 2) DNA tests will also
become available to detect genotypes that make persons more susceptible to
common diseases (e.g., familial cancers, heart disease, and diabetes). The
same caveat about validation also applies here.' 3) The number of persons
to be screened will be extremely large.9 4) The number of interested third
parties, besides family members, family physicians, and health authorities
(e.g., insurers and employers) will multiply, and this increases the chances
for genetic discrimination. Privacy and confidentiality issues will multiply.'°
5) Because DNA must often be collected from members of whole families,
and in some cases, from generations of family members, their awareness of
the ethical implications of testing will be deeper; secrets will be virtually
impossible to keep.l" 6) Disclosure dilemmas will multiply, especially be-
cause harmful genes will be detected presymptomatically in persons at high
risk for disorders of late onset, like Huntington disease. 2 7) Earlier prenatal
diagnosis (9-11 weeks) is now possible and will see greater demand since
chorionic villus sampling has proved to be as safe and accurate as amni-
ocentesis.13 Because information about gender will be more available earlier
in pregnancy, the opportunities for sex choice abortions, unrelated to genetic
disease, will greatly increase. 14
The six ethical problems in human genetics identified in the final section of
5. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETECTING HERI-
TABLE MUTATIONS IN HUMAN BEINGS 9 (1986).
6. Holtzman, Recombinant DNA Technology, Genetic Tests and Public Policy, 42 AM. J.
HUM. GEN. 624 (1988).
7. Id. at 624.
8. Id. at 625.
9. Id. at 626.
10. Id. at 629-30.
11. See Harris, Genetics, Counselling and the New Genetics, 4 TRENDS IN GENETICS 52,
55 (1988).
12. See Id. at 55.
13. See Goldsmith, Trial Appears to Confirm Safety of Chronic Villus Sampling Procedure,
259 J.A.M.A. 3521 (1988).
14. The same public policy considerations are applicable to other nations as well.
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this article preexisted the "new genetics." My main thesis is that these new
techniques do not create new ethical problems but magnify each preexisting
problem. DNA approaches to genetic diagnosis intensify and complicate
ethical problems that emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, when medical
genetics became a new field. The final section will also describe how trends
in human genetics will interact with trends in fetal and reproductive
medicine to create a more complex set of technological possibilities with far-
reaching ethical concerns.
II. A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF MEDICAL GENETICISTS 5
To gather data on ethical problems frequently encountered in the practice
of medical genetics, I conducted field studies in 1984 at 25 genetic centers in
12 nations. Valuable contacts with one or more key geneticists were made to
help with the future study. Dr. Wertz and I then developed a questionnaire
with 14 clinical cases frequently faced by geneticists in these and other na-
tions. Our goal was to study the degree of consensus and variation in the
geneticists' approaches to ethical problems they described as frequent and
difficult. Respondents were asked what they would do, from a list of possible
responses, and why, in their own words, they had chosen this particular
course of action. There were five questions on screening for genetic disor-
ders in populations and in the workplace. Finally, there were questions
about goals and approaches to counseling originally proposed by Fraser, 6 as
surveyed by previous researchers. 17
The questionnaires took two hours to complete and were answered anony-
mously. We selected geneticists who held an M.D., Ph.D., or equivalent
degree and were engaged in delivering or administering genetic services (test-
ing, counseling, prenatal diagnosis, laboratory work). Although in some na-
tions (notably the U.S.), counseling is sometimes done by specially-trained
persons who do not hold a doctorate, we decided to omit these persons to
control for consistency of training across the entire sample.
In each country, including the U.S., our contact geneticists tried to in-
clude all qualified medical geneticists in the survey. Lists were compiled
from certifying boards, genetic centers and the International Directory of Ge-
15. Our international study began in 1985 when the "New Genetics," a term coined by
Comings in Comings, Prenatal Diagnosis and the "New Genetics," 32 AM. J. HUM. GEN. 453
(1980), was first applied widely in clinical practice.
16. See Fraser, Genetic Counseling, 26 AM. J. HUM. GEN. 636 (1974).
17. See generally J. SORENSON, J. SWAZEY & N. SCOTCH, REPRODUCTIVE PASTS, RE-
PRODUCTIVE FUTURES: GENETIC COUNSELING AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS (1981).
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netic Services. 18
Of the 1053 geneticists asked to participate, 677 or 64 percent returned
questionnaires by the close of the study in February, 1987.19 87 percent of
these answered all parts of the questionnaires, including stating in their own
words why they had chosen particular courses of action. 87 percent held
M.D.s, 16 percent Ph.D.s, and 3 percent held other degrees. They had a
median of 14 years in the practice of genetics; 82 percent were members of
their national genetics society, and 77 percent were board certified or accred-
ited in countries where certification in genetics was possible (Canada, Hun-
gary, United Kingdom, United States). Respondents spent an average of 45
hours a week in genetics. 65 percent were male, and 82 percent were mar-
ried with a median of 1.5 children. Religious backgrounds were 40 percent
Protestant, 18 percent Catholic, 17 percent Jewish, 12 percent none, 13 per-
cent other. As a whole, they were nonpracticing, attending a median of one
religious observance a year. 49 percent characterized themselves as politi-
cally liberal, 15 percent as conservative, and 36 percent as both equally.
Our criteria for consensus were those frequently used in legislative
processes, in the absence of an accepted scientific criterion for consensus.
We used a "3/4's rule" (3/4's of the respondents in each of 3/4's of coun-
tries) to define a "strong consensus." This method allows representation to
each country. If we had used percentages of the total number of responses,
the U.S., with 44 percent of all respondents, would have been disproportion-
ately represented.
Cases with Consensus
There was strong consensus on 5, 36 percent, of the 14 clinical cases.
Three cases involved full disclosure of laboratory results that were conflict-
ing, ambiguous, or artifactual, or had new and controversial interpretations.
The problem with "full disclosure" of such results is that some parents may
decide for abortion on problematic information. In case 1, involving con-
flicting findings about the possibility of a minor neural tube defect in the
fetus, 98 percent of respondents would disclose all findings and 90 percent
would counsel nondirectively (greater than 66 percent in all nations except
Hungary) about continuing or terminating the pregnancy.
In case 2, involving disagreement with colleagues about ambiguous labo-
ratory results of prenatal diagnosis, 97 percent would disclose the disagree-
ment. In case 3, 94 percent would inform patients with a low measurement
18. MARCH OF DIMES BIRTH DEFECTS FOUNDATION, INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF
GENETIC SERVICES (8th ed. 1983).
19. See infra Appendix TABLE 1.
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of a fetal enzyme (alpha-fetoprotein) in a maternal blood test about a (then)
new and controversial interpretation suggesting Down syndrome; 82 percent
would disclose that geneticists disagreed about this interpretation.
In case 4, involving a problem of false paternity, which is often discovered
in genetic testing,2° 96 percent of the respondents believed that protection of
the mother's confidentiality overrode disclosure of true paternity. 81 percent
said that they would tell the mother in private, without the husband present,
and let her decide what to tell him; 13 percent would lie (e.g., tell the couple
that they are both responsible); and the remaining 2 percent would ascribe
the child's disorder to a new mutation, a one-in-a-million occurrence. As
their reasons for such answers, 58 percent cited preserving the family unit,
30 percent gave the mother's right to decide, and 13 percent gave the
mother's right to privacy.
In case 5 involving counseling strategies after prenatal diagnosis of chro-
mosomal disorders of relatively low burden, (i.e., Turner syndrome (the fe-
male infant will have only one X chromosome-XO) and XYY (the male
infant will have an "extra Y" chromosome)), there was strong consensus
that counseling should be nondirective for both disorders. The exceptions
were the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and France, where 43
percent, 60 percent, and 65 percent respectively would advise carrying an
XYY fetus to term or would give optimistically slanted information; and
Hungary and India, where 40 percent and 46 percent respectively would
advise aborting an XO fetus or would give pessimistically slanted
information.
Cases without Consensus
There was no strong international consensus in the remaining nine cases.
Unlike the above "disclosure problems," these cases involved significant con-
flicts between ethical principles and/or between the interests of different
parties.
Two cases reflected conflict between the geneticist's duty to preserve pa-
tient confidentiality and the duty to warn third parties (relatives at risk for
genetic disorders) of harm. In each case, the person with a mutant gene
(Huntington disease or hemophilia A) refused to permit disclosure of the
diagnosis to relatives at high risk for the same disorder. We expected that
more would disclose a diagnosis of hemophilia A than of Huntington disease
because the first is treatable. This was not the case. Instead, 58 percent (63
percent excluding the U.S.) would tell the relatives of the Huntington pa-
20. E.g., the woman knows who the true biological father is, but her husband believes
falsely that he carries a recessive gene like the mother.
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tient, and 60 percent (66 percent excluding the U.S.) would tell the relatives
of the hemophilia A patient. These averages included 24 percent and 29
percent respectively who would seek out and tell the relatives even if they
did not ask for information. Overall, 32 percent would preserve the confi-
dentiality of the Huntington patient and 10 percent would refer the matter to
the patient's family physician for decision. For hemophilia A, the corre-
sponding rates were 27 percent and 12 percent. There was strong consensus
for disclosure of the Huntington diagnosis in five nations: Australia, Brazil,
Denmark, Italy, and Norway, and strong consensus for disclosure of the
hemophilia A diagnosis in three nations: Australia, Brazil, and Denmark.
Two situations involved disclosure of psychologically sensitive informa-
tion that might harm the patient. In one case, disclosing which parent had a
balanced translocation might enable the couple and relatives at risk to use
reproductive options that would prevent the birth of another Down child,
but could also cause guilt in the carrier or threaten the marriage. In another
case, disclosing an XY genotype in an infertile woman could severely damage
her self-image, but could resolve doubts about fertility. Both cases involve
conflicts between the geneticist's duty to tell the truth (which also may be
phrased in terms of the patient's right to know) and the duty to do no harm.
In both cases, patients have asked for information about causation, but have
not asked specific questions about their carrier status or genotype.
On average, respondents were equally divided about disclosure, with 54
percent (46 percent outside the U.S.) saying that they would disclose,
unasked, which parent was a carrier and 51 percent (41 percent excluding
the U.S.) disclosing XY genotype. In the translocation case, 43 percent
would tell the couple that the information exists and give them the choice of
knowing or not knowing. There was strong consensus in Switzerland in
favor of disclosure of which parent carried the translocation, and strong con-
sensus in Japan against such disclosure. There was strong consensus in 7
nations, Brazil, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary,
Norway, and Switzerland, against disclosure of XY genotype; where as in
two countries, Canada and United States, a majority (68 percent and 64 per-
cent, respectively) would do so.
A further case involved a genetic disorder (tuberous sclerosis) that cannot
be diagnosed prenatally. Would counselors discuss all reproductive options
with parents, including new techniques like artificial insemination by donor
(AID), in vitro fertilization (IVF) of a donated egg, and insemination of a
surrogate mother with the husband's sperm? AID was widely accepted: 83
percent would present this as an option (72 percent excluding the U.S.).
IVF with donor egg was less widely accepted, 66 percent (52 percent outside
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the U.S.). A total of 46 percent (28 percent excluding the U.S.) would pres-
ent surrogate motherhood as an option. Adoption as an option received
strong consensus. Surprisingly, there was not consensus about presenting
"taking a chance," contraception, or sterilization.
Three cases concerned prenatal diagnosis. In one, 85 percent (76 percent
excluding the U.S.) would perform prenatal diagnosis, or refer, for a couple
who refused abortion. This information is very important in nations that
ration prenatal diagnosis through universal health insurance. Respondents
reasoned that giving prenatal diagnosis should not depend on the use pa-
tients intended to make of the information. 34 percent stated that patients
might change their mind about abortion. Refusals were largely based on
lack of resources.
In a second case, 73 percent (61 percent excluding the U.S.) would either
perform prenatal diagnosis for maternal anxiety in the absence of any other
medical indications (63 percent) or refer the patient to a doctor who would
perform it for this reason. Of those in favor, 56 percent gave patient auton-
omy as their major reason and 46 percent gave the removal of anxiety.
Among those opposed, 61 percent gave possible harm to the fetus as their
major reason, and 70 percent gave waste of resources.
The final case was the most controversial in the entire survey; 42 percent
(26 percent excluding the U.S.) would either perform prenatal diagnosis for
sex selection (25 percent) or refer the couple to another medical geneticist or
genetics unit who might do so (17 percent). There was strong consensus
against performance in ten nations. Only in the United States, Hungary, and
India would a majority expedite the diagnosis. Their reasons differed
widely.
In the U.S., 68 percent of those who would perform it or refer would do so
out of respect for parental autonomy; in Hungary, all 15 of those offering
prenatal diagnosis would do so in order to prevent the otherwise certain
abortion of a normal fetus. In another five countries substantial minorities
would either perform prenatal diagnosis or refer: Canada (47 percent), Swe-
den (38 percent), Israel (33 percent), Brazil (30 percent) and Greece (29
percent). In their reasoning 30 percent of respondents (the same rate as in
the U.S.) said that they opposed the abortion of a normal fetus or that the
interests of the fetus should be weighed equally with those of living persons.
Of the 605 persons who gave reasons for their actions in this case, only 4.7
percent brought up the position of women in society, 0.5 percent mentioned
maintaining a balanced sex ratio, 0.6 percent mentioned limiting the popula-
tion, and 4.9 percent cited setting a precedent that would harm the moral
order. The exception was India, where 61 percent evoked at least one of
1989]
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these social issues. 28 percent of all respondents brought in issues related to
justice, such as wise use of medical resources or diversion away from pa-
tients at genetic risk.
Genetic Screening
There was strong consensus on four out of five questions about screening
and access to results. Respondents substantially agreed that mass screening
for carriers of cystic fibrosis or for genetic susceptibility to work-related dis-
ease should be voluntary. There was very strong consensus that third par-
ties, such as employers and insurers, should not have access to the results of
screening without the patient's consent. Although there was more consensus
about screening than about clinical cases, all the examples of screening were
hypothetical, exceeding scientific capabilities in 1985. When fully devel-
oped, the tests may be accompanied by unforeseen technical, economic, and
social problems that will reduce the degree of consensus.
Significance and Implications
This cross-cultural study found more variation than consensus about four-
teen clinical cases and found consensus on most of the screening questions.
What conclusions can be drawn?
First, cultural differences in approaches to ethical problems arising from
genetic technologies still seem to be substantial. This finding tends to refute
the view that the diffusion of technology is socially determined, carried by a
Western cultural tradition that resolves ethical disputes in favor of the dif-
fusers of technology.2
Second, the main lesson of the study is that the central thrust of the moral
reasoning of medical geneticists in these nations is to protect the autonomy
of the individual patient (or parents) and exercise responsibility to meet the
needs of the patient. The study found strongest consensus in cases in which
it is relatively easy to enhance and protect the welfare of the patient, (e.g.,
that counseling should be nondirective, that genetic information should be
protected from insurers and employers, and that ambiguous test findings
ought to be fully disclosed). Cases judged to be the most difficult (i.e., confi-
dentiality vs. interests of relatives, disclosure of XY in a female, and sex
selection) had conflicts between respect for the autonomy of patients and the
welfare of others. In the new genetics, these problems involve the welfare of
many others and the best interests of society itself. Compared with the
claims of autonomy, the concerns of justice appeared less frequently in re-
21. See J. RIFKIN, ALGENY 53 (1983) (espousing a view of ethics as technologically
determined).
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sponses, except for strong recognition of problems of distributive justice in
inadequate genetic services.
Thirdly, attempts to gain consensus about approaches to ethical problems
have strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, consensus-seeking
helps to consolidate experience and enable older practitioners to transmit
what they have learned to younger ones. Findings about consensus are use-
ful in conveying clear positions to the public and to policy makers. Also,
formulating consensus on older problems releases valuable energy to focus
on new, unfamiliar problems.
On the negative side, the mere fact that consensus exists about an ap-
proach to an ethical problem is not the primary source of ethical grounding
of the approach. As Mareno correctly points out, consensus should be pri-
marily regarded as a condition of ethical inquiry rather than its goal.22 The
goal of ethical reflection is a well-reasoned conclusion of an argument, based
on a premise which soundly appeals to ethical principles, and which takes
into account all sides of a question and all rational approaches. The conclu-
sion, with the accompanying argument, should be within the ethical reach of
many and also teachable. That many, perhaps most, persons will be per-
suaded by the argument is an important condition but does not by itself win
the day for the argument.
Appeal to consensus can also mask cultural dominance. Preference for
individual over societal interests, a U.S. - Western cultural bias, is clearly
evident in the study's findings. Also, excessive attempts at consensus could
suppress vital minority positions, often the most creative and critical. Fi-
nally, some geneticists objected to an effort at consensus because it could
lead to "written guidelines" that invite legal vulnerability for those who act
differently. Others pointed out that the field of medical genetics is too tech-
nologically fluid to find strong consensus on some issues.
The major tension in health care ethics is between the interests of individ-
uals and families and the larger interests of society. Based on the ethical
perspective outlined in the next section, it appears that the major weakness
of the approaches that have evolved in most nations in the West is that inter-
ests of society are too heavily outweighed in crucial cases by the interests of
individuals. A stronger balance between societal and individual interests can
help to reshape an overly individualistic approach that could have harmful
consequences to other persons, to society, and also to medical genetics.
22. Mareno, Ethics By Committee: The Moral Authority of Consensus, - J. MED. &
PHIL. - (1989) (in press).
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III. ETHICS IN A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
Any viable practical approach to ethical problems in medical genetics
must be able to address cross-cultural problems in ethics. Increasingly, med-
ical geneticists see patients from other cultures with different ethical beliefs
and world views. Also, medical geneticists from a wide variety of religious,
cultural, and social backgrounds must work together under the same roof,
and in the same national and international professional and scientific socie-
ties. Geneticists confront the same serious ethical problems. Can the
problems be understood and resolved without adopting absolutist ethical
views, or without falling back on a view of ethical relativism with no limits
to toleration of harmful or oppressive acts, if these are considered morally
right in some society? Is there some "common ground" in ethics?
The findings of this study would not surprise anthropologists or dismay
advocates of cultural or ethical relativism.23 Cultural diversity in moral
views is a social fact observed since Herodotus. One response to cultural
diversity is to treat it as a factual datum for ethics, without drawing any
conclusion about what is right or wrong. Another response is to draw con-
clusions by taking a position of ethical relativism. Ladd, defines ethical rela-
tivism as:
the doctrine that the moral rightness and wrongness of actions var-
ies from society to society and that there are no absolute universal
moral standards binding on all men at all times. Accordingly, it
holds that whether or not it is right for an individual to act in a
certain way depends on or is relative to the society to which he
belongs. What is right in one society may be wrong in another
society and may be neither right nor wrong in a third society.24
An ethical relativist viewing this study would deny that any common
ground exists for a cross-cultural perspective in ethics and would advise tol-
erance. At its extreme, the relativist view would permit approaches to ethi-
cal problems in human genetics that most rational persons would find
intolerable. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond the relativist view and
seek ethical guidance on a cross-cultural basis.
Ethical guidance on a cross-cultural basis involves respect for the domi-
nant moral opinion found in different cultures and also in various sectors of
a pluralistic society. But this respect is not unlimited. Following
MacBeath, 2- Ladd states that culturally variable moral opinions ought to be
23. See E. HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY (1983).
24. J. LADD, ETHICAL RELATIVISM 1 (1985). This is an outstanding text on the subject
of ethical relativism.
25. See generally A. MacBeath, Experiments in Living (1952).
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seen as "experiments in living" which provide data for ethics, and which
ethics should not neglect.26 In this sense, giving respect to the differing
moral opinions of geneticists is the equivalent of what Ladd calls "construc-
tive relativism."27 This position elevates popular moral opinion (such as the
moral views held by geneticists in this study) to the moral level. Ladd
adopts this position, and likens popular moral opinion in a society to the
legislative will. He accords it a leading, but not absolute role, in constituting
morality. He notes that this view of moral opinion or custom has "affinities
with the general ethical position known as voluntarism, for, by analogy, we
can conceive of popular opinion as embodying the will of the people, which
determines what is right and wrong." 2 The connection between Ladd's
thought and the work here concerns approaches taken by medical geneticists
should be viewed as voluntary and chosen by them as morally serious per-
sons, rather than imposed on them unwillingly. The good response rate to a
questionnaire requiring several hours to complete supports an impression of
moral seriousness among geneticists.
The opposite of constructive relativism is "destructive relativism," a view
that reduces morality itself to the level of popular opinion and drains all of
its moral character away.29 Ladd observes that this form of reductionism is
commonly used to convert a moral proposition into a statement about the
proposer or the society of the proposer.3° Thus, the normative character of
moral statements is neutralized and morality is understood as not binding at
all.
Alongside the voluntaristic element in morality, Ladd requires a
"nonvoluntaristic element," independent of the received moral opinions.3"
He moves between two descriptions of the nonvoluntaristic element. Ladd
describes it in one place as "a principle, however formal and general, that
confers authority and legitimacy" on "quasi-legislative cultural definitions of
what is right and wrong."32 In another place, he calls it a "schema for
morals, which is to be filled in by the culture itself as it 'experiments in
living.' ,33 He notes that the "schema" is necessary to answer the objections
against ethical relativism that ethical relativism would require recognition of
the moral opinion that fostered Nazism and its atrocities as "equally
26. See LADD, supra note 24, at 123.
27. Id. at 121.
28. Id. at 123.
29. Id. at 124.
30. Id. at 124-25.
31. Id. at 123.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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valid.",34 Constructive relativism is thus a form of restricted relativism, per-
mitting variety in moral institutions, but ruling out the intolerable. Destruc-
tive relativism, i.e., reductionism, leaves room for no ethical response in the
face of the intolerable, since mere opinion is seen to be the essence of
morality.
Perhaps the clearest example of a totally nonvoluntaristic element, (but
not what I espouse), is the concept of natural law. Brendan Brown's legal
thought was based on a version of natural law.35 Natural law embodies the
idea that objective ethical standards are "given" in human nature itself, in-
dependent of a society's laws or religion, and that these standards can be
known by all rational persons. As applied to human genetics, a natural law
view would hold that certain actions, e.g., sex selection, attempts to make
chimeras by human-animal hybrids, or causing harmful mutations in a pop-
ulation, are wrong because they are "unnatural." This judgment would be
made independent of harmful consequences because of the violation of natu-
ral law. Today, moral judgments made in terms of natural law as applied to
human genetics are most often made in opposition to the practice of selective
abortion.
Natural law is, of course, not the only example of a "schema" or
nonvoluntaristic element. Schema-building in contemporary Western cul-
tures mainly employs ethical principles widely recognized across religious,
philosophical, and cultural boundaries. Several anthropologists, most nota-
bly Hatch36 have evoked prima facie principles to "use in evaluating cul-
tures, including our own."3 7 In fact, he chooses four principles but only one
is recognizably "ethical." He refers to a "humanistic" principle, namely,
that "the well-being of people ought to be respected.", 38 He uses well-being
to make moral judgments on starvation and violence wherever these occur.
Contemporary moral philosophers have used other terms to describe what
Ladd calls the "schema," e.g., a "second tier of the moral life,"' 39 "the criti-
cal level of basic ethical principles,"''4 or "the ethical level per se."4  All of
these terms describe a move from a level of popular, intuitive morality in
particular communities to a more general and impartial level of principles.
Instead of using the term "schema," I prefer to use "a cross-cultural per-
34. Id. at 123.
35. See, e.g., B. BROWN, AROUND THE WORLD IN SEVENTY DAYS 52-67 (1976).
36. See generally HATCH, supra note 23.
37. Id. at 133.
38. Id. at 134.
39. See H. ENGLEHARDT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 49-56 (1988).
40. See R. HARE, MORAL THINKING 44-64 (1981).
41. See H. AIKEN, REASON AND CONDUCT 181 (1962).
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spective" in ethics. Just as Ladd requires that "popular moral opinion" be
limited by a "schema" or nonvoluntaristic element, I would require that ge-
neticists' be limited by a cross-cultural perspective in ethics when approach-
ing ethical problems. Ordinarily, the term "cross-cultural" conveys a
relativistic approach. I hold, with Ladd, that constructive relativism is the
correct view of cultural diversity in morality. Therefore, in my view a cross-
cultural perspective is a schema both to prevent the intolerable and to en-
courage cross-cultural "experiments in living" that would help geneticists be
open to change. A cross-cultural perspective would encourage experimenta-
tion in breaking out of old moral molds, drawing new lines where none ex-
isted before, or in redrawing moral lines that have been allowed to blur.
I agree with Ladd that the "schema" or the "perspective" is culture-de-
pendent, or "must be filled in by the culture." No view in ethics is entirely
free from its cultural origins and dependency. Ethical absolutism will al-
ways founder on this historical reality as well as on the coercion and disloca-
tion required to impose it on those with different views. The perspective
taken here (basic ethical principles and relationships) is characteristic of
some contemporary Western ethical reasoning. The middle way, however,
between ethical relativism and absolutism lies precisely in the claim that eth-
ical principles make demands on everyone alike and that the responsibilities
inherent in certain relationships (e.g., physician-patient) make demands on
all who are in these relationships. Basic ethical principles are universal and
objective in just this sense, namely, that everyone ought to do what the prin-
ciples say, assuming that persons 1) know the principles and 2) "can" do
what they require.42 In ethics, "ought implies can."43 Therefore, if it is
impossible to respond to the ought, allowances must be made. This princi-
ple, "ought implies can," is the antidote for ethical absolutism. Below, are
recommendations that geneticists in most nations are capable of following.
Ethical Problems and Standards in Medical Genetics Today
There are two types of situations commonly identified as "ethical
problems." The first is when a person or group is perceived by others to be
in basic violation of responsibilities to the welfare of a significant human
community. The ethical problem is how the community ought to respond.
The second situation finds persons, like the geneticists in this study or their
patients, confronting sharply conflicting duties, making a decision that ex-
presses the conflict. These two situations can and often do, coalesce.
Every ethical problem arises in a situation that has elements of: 1) collec-
42. LADD, supra note 24, at 127.
43. Id.
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tively defined loyalty; and 2) individuals or groups confronting decisions that
express conflicts. These conflicts may be among ethical principles, among
responsibilities transmitted in roles like "physician" and "patient," or
among loyalties owed to communities beyond the medical situation, (e.g.,
familial, legal, or religious).
The study shows that geneticists and their patients, even in nations with
very different cultural traditions, tend to face a similar set of ethical
problems. These problems are: 1) access to and adequacy of genetic services;
2) abortion choices; 3) confidentiality conflicts; 4) disclosure dilemmas; 5)
indications for prenatal diagnosis; and 6) exceptions to the practice of
nondirective counseling. I rank these problems using three criteria: 1) the
study's results; 2) frequency of discussion;" and 3) by numbers of persons
whose welfare is adversely affected by the problem.
1. On a cross-cultural basis, the two-sided problem of unfairness in access
to genetic services (i.e., counseling, screening, prenatal diagnosis) and insuffi-
cient services to meet needs, is the most ubiquitous ethical problem in
human genetics. This problem is especially acute for individuals, families
and pregnant women who are not referred to genetic services by physicians,
who suffer from poverty or lack of education, or who live far from a genetic
center.
2. Abortion choices for genetic reasons present difficult conflicts and con-
cerns in every society due to several causes: a) beliefs about the higher moral
status of the fetus at midtrimester; b) the wide spectrum of severity in some
disorders; c) the treatability of some disorders; d) concern that a practice of
selective abortion creates a precedent for neglect of genetically affected per-
sons who survive, including precedent for a practice of pediatric euthanasia;
and e) the possibility of diagnosing twins where one is healthy and the other
affected. A decision not to abort after a positive genetic finding can also be
an ethical problem if the woman or couple involved are pressured to abort or
threatened with loss of medical care.
3. The duty to protect patients' privacy and to maintain the confidential-
ity of the patient-geneticist relationship is a problem in every nation. Genet-
icists have a duty to prevent unconsenting disclosures of their patients'
genetic diagnoses and health prognoses. This duty can sometimes conflict
with the interests of relatives at risk and especially with the collective inter-
ests of institutional third parties, (e.g., insurers, employers, or government
health authorities).
4. Disclosure dilemmas in medical genetics exist in every society. They
arise largely from the geneticist's access to psychologically sensitive informa-
44. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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tion. For example, when the geneticist knows, but a married couple does not
yet know which one has transmitted a disorder to a child; when tests reveal
that a phenotypical female has an XY genotype; when tests show false pater-
nity; when a woman has had previous elective abortions and her husband
does not know; when scientific conflicts occur about the interpretation of
findings and an abortion might ensue; or when disclosure of a genetic diag-
nosis to a vulnerable or fragile individual may carry a risk of harm.
5. Some patient requests or preconditions for prenatal diagnosis, (e.g.,
maternal anxiety, refusal of abortion, and sex selection) are ethically contro-
versial, especially the latter. However, ethical problems in indications for
prenatal diagnosis affect the welfare of far fewer persons than the four
problems introduced above.
6. This study shows that nondirectiveness is the most widely ingrained
approach to genetic counseling, when viewed cross-culturally. However,
ethical problems do arise in choices to be nondirective, especially in counsel-
ing patients whose capacity to participate in counseling and decision making
is impaired. These patients may be mentally ill, significantly retarded, or
abusers of alcohol or drugs. Some patients may be disadvantaged in terms of
communication because they lack adequate education. Further, some pa-
tients from a different culture may hold different views about science and
nature than the geneticist. For such reasons, all of the above patients may be
functionally unable to appreciate the significance of genetic risks. These
cases were infrequently mentioned by our respondents, but were the subject
of notes on questionnaires pointing out that such problems exist, especially
in cases of severe retardation and substance abuse.
These six ethical problems in medical genetics have been present since the
introduction of amniocentesis and carrier screening in the late 1960s, but the
problems magnify in complexity and frequency as genetic technologies im-
prove and the numbers of persons attending genetic clinics increases. This
magnification is especially obvious in the context of the "new genetics."
My arguments in the section above are based on a conviction that there
are serious limitations to the toleration of wide cultural differences on some
ethical problems, despite apparently wide cultural differences.
Proposed Ethical Guidelines
When the claims of basic ethical principles are considered together with
the needs of patients and families and the responsibilities of geneticists, the
following guidelines should and can be adopted in each of the participating
nations:
1. Medical geneticists should disclose all clinically relevant information to
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patients and family members, consistent with considerations of immaturity
and psychological well-being. Psychological assessments are best done in
consultation with mental health professionals.
2. Confidentiality is a strong but not absolute norm in medicine and in
medical genetics. When claims of nonmaleficence to prevent harm to others
places a limit on the physician's or counselor's duty of confidentiality, four
conditions should be satisfied before breaching confidentiality:
(1) reasonable efforts to elicit voluntary consent to disclosure have
failed; (2) there is a high probability both that harm will occur if
the information is withheld and that the disclosed information will
actually be used to avert harm; (3) the harm that identifiable indi-
viduals would suffer would be serious; and (4) appropriate precau-
tions are taken to ensure that only the genetic information needed
for diagnosis and/or treatment of the disease in question is
disclosed.45
3. Medical geneticists should safeguard the options of parents in genetic
services, including the option of abortion. An important moral line about
selective abortion exists in the public mind. As stated by Elias and Annas:
"as controversial as elective abortion is, the use of abortion when a woman is
carrying a fetus with a severe genetic defect is very well accepted by a vast
majority of both the public and physicians. '"46 Data collected by the Na-
tional Opinion Research Center between 1972 and 1987 on trends in U.S.
public opinion on genetic reasons for abortion show that between 75 percent
and 77 percent of those surveyed support abortion of a serious genetic dis-
ease.4 7 The American public's views also overwhelmingly supports 89 per-
cent making genetic testing available for serious and fatal genetic diseases.4 1
4. Medical geneticists should not acquiesce to patient requests for sex se-
lection unrelated to the diagnosis of a sex-linked disease. Three reasons sup-
port this position: 1) gender is not a genetic defect; 2) equality between
males and females is violated; and 3) sex selection is a precedent for eugen-
ics, i.e., "tinkering" at parental whim with characteristics unrelated to any
genetic disease. If patients have a genetic reason for diagnosis and also show
45. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GE-
NETIC CONDITIONS 44 (1983).
46. S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW 146 (1987) (em-
phasis added).
47. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY. BACKGROUND PAPER: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 74-75
(1987).
48. Id.
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excessive interest in the gender of the fetus, geneticists can consider delayed
disclosure of gender after timely disclosure of clinical findings.
5. Genetics services programs should be voluntary in nature. Forcing
persons to accept genetic services in order to prevent disorders may be "cost-
beneficial" but it would be morally destructive and self-defeating in the long
run.4 9 It would be completely contradictory to espouse an institution of
parenthood based on companionate choice and privacy and then impose
mandatory genetic testing. However, sufficient genetic services should exist
in modem societies to offer to everyone who needs them. Genetic burdens
are among the most arbitrary and punishing that life imposes on human
beings. From the standpoint of ethics grounded either in religious or secular
sources, remedying natural injustices and injustices that stem from lack of
opportunity for education and access to health care are at the heart of the
enterprise of human genetics.
Use of these guidelines to overcome diversity strengthens the profession to
meet the very complex problems immediately on the horizon. Of course, the
main forums in which these propositions should be deliberated are national
and international organizations of medical geneticists.
IV. CONCLUSION: TRENDS IN GENETICS AND ALLIED FIELDS
Some steps in identifying problems and standards for geneticists, even in a
cross-cultural perspective, are possible. In short, it can be done and it ought
to be done. The stakes are too high, in terms of the potential for relief of
human suffering, to do otherwise.
However, it promises more complexity on every side of the developing
field of medical genetics. Trends in human genetics will interact with trends
in fetal and reproductive medicine to create a complex, interrelated set of
technological possibilities with important ethical concerns: 1) Earlier meth-
ods of prenatal diagnosis, including the potential for diagnosis in the preim-
plantation human embryo;50 2) the potential for general pregnancy screening
in a population; 3) Potential for fetal therapy, including attempts on the
molecular level;5" 4) The potential for using fetal cells and tissues after in-
duced abortion for treatment of disorders, including genetic disorders, in
49. See Smith, Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Safety, 1985 So. ILL. L.J. 438-440 for an
historical analysis of the concept of eugenics.
50. See generally Prenatal Diagnosis Before Implantation: Opportunities and Problems, 5
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 85 (1985).
51. See M. HARRISON, M. GOLBUS & R. FULLY, THE UNBORN PATIENT: PRENATAL
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT (2d ed.) (in press).
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older persons and children;52 5) Screening for genotypes that render individ-
uals more susceptible to common diseases like cancer and heart disease;53 6)
Screening in the workplace for genotypes that render individuals more sus-
ceptible to harms from toxins and other industrial hazards;54 7) Opportuni-
ties for clinical treatment of DNA-diagnosed genetic disorders55 and for
somatic cell human gene therapy;56 8) In vitro fertilization and the potential
it creates for: a) genetic research on the human pre-embryo57 b) future at-
tempts at human germline gene therapy58 c) eugenically-inspired genetic
engineering. 59
These possibilities in human genetics and related fields raise ethical, social
and legal concerns that require study and guidance by councils at the highest
level of government and the professions.
52. See generally Sladek & Shoulson, Neural Transplantation: A Call for Patience Rather
Than Patients, 240 SCIENCE 1386 (1988).
53. See generally White & Caskey, The Human as an Experimental System in Molecular
Genetics, 240 SCIENCE 1483 (1988).
54. See Murray, The Social Context of Workplace Screening, 14-5 HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT 21 (1984).
55. See White & Caskey, supra note 51, at 1487.
56. See Anderson, Prospects for Human Gene Therapy, 226 SCIENCE 401 (1984).
57. See West, Angell, Thatcher, Gosden, Hastie, Glasier, Baird, Sexing the Human Pre-
Embryo by DNA-DNA in-Site Hybridization, 2 LANCET 1345 (1987).
58. See Anderson, Human Gene Therapy: Scientific and Ethical Considerations, 10 J.
MED. PHIL. 275 (1985); Fletcher, Ethical Issues In and Beyond Prospective Clinical Trials of
Human Gene Therapy, 10 J. MED. PHIL. 293, 294 (1985).
59. See generally J. GLOVER, WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE SHOULD THERE BE? (1984).
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APPENDIX
Tat
Nation
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Denmark
Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG)
France
German Democratic
Republic (GDR)
Greece
Hungary
India
Israel
Italy
Japan
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Total
)le 1. Participating Nations
Number Number of
Asked To Persons
Participate Responding
14 12
51 32
73 47
28 15
55
35
25
11
18
40
17
26
74
10
26
10
50
490
1,503
Response
Rate
86
63
64
58
85
49
80
64
83
67
88
42
69
60
81
50
66
60
64
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